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Locus of Control and Job Search Strategies
* 
 
Standard job search theory assumes that unemployed individuals have perfect information 
about the effect of their search effort on the job offer arrival rate. In this paper, we present an 
alternative model which assumes instead that each individual has a subjective belief about 
the impact of his or her search effort on the rate at which job offers arrive. These beliefs 
depend in part on an individual’s locus of control, i.e., the extent to which a person believes 
that future outcomes are determined by his or her own actions as opposed to external 
factors. We estimate the impact of locus of control on job search behavior using a novel 
panel data set of newly-unemployed individuals in Germany. Consistent with our theoretical 
predictions, we find evidence that individuals with an internal locus of control search more 
and that individuals who believe that their future outcomes are determined by external factors 
have lower reservation wages. 
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Standard job search theory assumes that unemployed individuals have perfect information
about the eﬀect of their search eﬀort on the job oﬀer arrival rate. In this paper, we present
an alternative model which assumes instead that each individual has a subjective belief
about the impact of his or her search eﬀort on the rate at which job oﬀers arrive. This
subjective belief depends in part on individuals’ ‘locus of control’, which is deﬁned as a
generalized expectation about the internal versus external control of reinforcement (Rotter,
1966). A person whose external locus of control dominates tends to believe that much of
what happens is beyond his or her control. Life’s outcomes are instead attributed to
other forces, like fate or luck, rather than to ones own actions. In contrast, a person with
an internal locus of control sees future outcomes as being contingent on his or her own
decisions and behavior.
It is quite intuitive that people who believe that success in life largely depends on
their own actions and eﬀorts rather than on luck or other “external” forces in turn expect
diﬀerent returns to their own behavior—particularly with respect to investment decisions
like educational choices—than individuals with a more external locus of control. Given
this, it seems sensible to expect that locus of control will have an important eﬀect on
many economic outcomes and in particular, that internality will be positively correlated
with economic success.
In fact, several empirical studies do conclude that locus of control is correlated with
labor market success, in particular wages. An early example is Andrisani (1977, 1981) who
examines National Longitudinal Survey data and ﬁnds that individuals with an internal
locus of control in 1968 had signiﬁcantly higher hourly wages two years later. Similarly,
Osborne Groves (2005) analyzes data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Women and concludes that women with an internal locus of control earn more than women
with an external locus of control. Semykina and Linz (2007) also ﬁnd a positive association
between the locus of control and wages for Russian women, though not for Russian men.
The evidence from studies based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is more
mixed. For example Duncan and Morgan’s (1981) replication study of Andrisani (1977)
fails to produce evidence of a strong link between locus of control and wage rates1, though
Duncan and Dunifon (1998) ﬁnd that an internal locus of control is positively related to
wages some 20-25 years later. Using German data Anger and Heineck (2009) ﬁnd a wage
penalty for individuals with a highly external locus of control.
Investment decisions also appear to be linked to individuals’ locus of control. In partic-
ular, Coleman and Deleire (2003) conclude that locus of control aﬀects education decisions
primarily by inﬂuencing teenagers’ expectations regarding the return to human capital in-
vestments.2 Cebi (2007), however, is not able to replicate these results using a diﬀerent
data set once cognitive ability is controlled for. Still, the potential link between individu-
als’ locus of control and their human capital investments raises questions about the extent
1In a reply to this article Andrisani (1981) argues that Duncan and Morgan actually failed to disprove
his results and cites several other studies that conﬁrm his ﬁndings.
2Hansemark (2003) ﬁnds evidence for a positive impact of internal locus of control on the probability
of starting a new business for men, but not for women.
2to which locus of control aﬀects wages directly via productivity versus indirectly through
skills acquisition. Piatek and Pinger (2009), for example, conclude that locus of control
aﬀects wages only indirectly through the schooling decision. Heckman et al. (2006) use
indicators of self-esteem and locus of control to construct a one-dimensional, latent factor
representing noncognitive skills. They ﬁnd that noncognitive skills have both a direct wage
eﬀect (via productivity) and an indirect wage eﬀect (via schooling and work experience).
To our knowledge, there exist only three previous studies that assess the eﬀect of locus
of control on transitions from unemployment to employment.3 Gallo et al. (2004) and
Uhlendorﬀ (2004) analyze the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) and conclude that
a higher sense of internal control is associated with a higher probability of reemployment
and with shorter spells of unemployment, respectively.4 Neither study, however, is able
to distinguish between the eﬀect that locus of control as a form of unobserved ability
has in directly aﬀecting the probability of receiving a job oﬀer and the role that locus of
control might play in shaping expectations about the return to investments in job search.
In independent work, McGee (2010) takes a similar approach to ours to investigate job
search among respondents in the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
and ﬁnds that young unemployed men with an internal locus of control search more and
have higher reservation wages. Although he lacks a direct measure of individuals’ beliefs
about the payoﬀs to job search, McGee estimates models of the propensity to receive a
job oﬀer conditional on having made contact with an employer and ﬁnds results that are
consistent with his assumption that locus of control inﬂuences search behavior through
beliefs about the eﬃcacy of job search rather than productivity per se.
Our paper advances this previous literature in two important ways. First, unlike McGee
(2010), we directly examine the link between individuals’ locus of control and their beliefs
about the payoﬀs to job search. Second, we develop a job search model which incorporates
individuals’ subjective beliefs about the eﬀect of their search eﬀort on the job oﬀer arrival
rate. Speciﬁcally, individuals with an internal locus of control believe that job search is
associated with a relatively large increase in the probability of ﬁnding a job, while those
with an external locus of control believe that search has little eﬀect on the job oﬀer arrival
rate. Unemployed individuals who believe that labor market success depends on their own
eﬀorts are consequently expected to search more and have higher reservation wages. Like
Coleman and Deleire (2003), we contrast these predictions to those from an alternative
model in which locus of control is viewed as a form of ability that has a direct impact on
the productivity of the worker. In this alternative model, individuals with a more internal
locus of control have a higher job arrival rate, independent of their search eﬀort, because
they are more able. They are expected to have higher reservation wages, but to search less.
Thus, we are able to use our theoretical model to generate empirically testable predictions
and to formally distinguish between alternative explanations of the link between locus of
control and job search.
We test the implications of our model by estimating the impact of an individual’s locus
3Job search strategies have been linked to workers’ impatience, however, see DellaVigna and Paserman
(2005).
4Uhlendorﬀ (2004) ﬁnds this eﬀect only for West Germany.
3of control on his or her search intensity and reservation wage using a novel panel data set
of newly unemployed individuals in Germany. Speciﬁcally, our data are from the ﬁrst wave
of the IZA Evaluation Data Set (see Caliendo et al., 2009, for details). This data set is
based on approximately 17,000 individuals who became unemployed between late 2007 and
early 2008. This large number of observations allows us to apply non-parametric matching
methods in addition to standard regression techniques. This is an advantage compared
to data sources like the SOEP or the NLSY which usually contain a relatively small
number of unemployment spells per year. The data are unique in providing us with detailed
information about search behavior, reservation wages and diﬀerent psychological traits
including locus of control. Moreover, our survey data can be linked to administrative data
containing detailed information about previous employment histories including previous
wages and time spent in unemployment. This is important in our context because this
information goes a long way towards capturing unobserved individual characteristics which
might be correlated with both locus of control and current job search behavior.
The interviews were conducted approximately two months after individuals entered
unemployment. The data allow us to observe the impact of the locus of control on job
search behavior directly and thereby to discriminate between alternative models of the
mechanism through which locus of control aﬀects job search. Additionally, all individuals
are interviewed at the same point in time during their unemployment spell. Thus concerns
about potential reverse causality which is a particular challenge in studies of the relation-
ship between noncognitive skills and labor market outcomes are reduced substantially. In
contrast, in surveys like the SOEP and the NLSY the timing of the measurement of the
locus of control and the beginning of unemployment spells typically varies substantially
across individuals.
We ﬁnd that the marginal eﬀect of an additional job application on individuals’ propen-
sity to report that they are very likely to get a job in the next period is higher among those
job seekers with an internal locus of control. Moreover, individuals with a more external
locus of control have lower reservation wages and search less intensively. These results are
consistent with locus of control aﬀecting search behavior through individuals’ subjective
beliefs about the payoﬀ to job search rather than simply through individuals’ unobserved
ability.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model, while
Section 3 describes the data in detail. In Section 4 we present our estimation strategy and
the results before Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We begin by assuming that each unemployed individual searches sequentially for a job in a
stationary environment. Job oﬀers arrive for a given search eﬀort s with arrival rate λ(s).
This arrival rate depends positively on individuals’ search eﬀort and the marginal return to
search eﬀort is decreasing (i.e. λ0 > 0 and λ00 < 0). Job oﬀers represent independent draws
from a wage distribution F(w) which is known by the unemployed. Each unemployed
individual receives unemployment beneﬁts b and and faces search costs c(s) which are
4increasing in search eﬀort (i.e. c0 > 0 and c00 > 0).
Each time a job oﬀer arrives, individuals must decide whether to accept the oﬀer or to
reject it and to search further. The optimal search strategy will rest in part on choosing a
reservation wage, i.e., the wage at which the beneﬁts of continued search are just equal to
the additional search costs.5 Any wage oﬀer above the reservation wage is accepted, while
any oﬀer below the reservation wage is rejected.
2.1 Locus of Control and the Return to Search Eﬀort
Unlike the standard search model, we assume that individuals do not know the exact
relationship between their own search eﬀort s and the job oﬀer arrival rate λ(s). Instead,
we assume that each individual has a subjective belief—given by (λ∗(s,loc))—about the
eﬀect of s on λ which depends on the extent to which an individual has an internal
locus of control (loc).6 Individuals with an internal locus of control believe that increased
search eﬀort results in a relatively large increase in the job oﬀer arrival rate. In contrast,
individuals who feel that their own behavior does not inﬂuence future outcomes believe
that additional search eﬀort has little eﬀect on the rate at which job oﬀers arrive. In other
words,
∂λ∗(s,loc)
∂s is assumed to be higher for those with a more internal locus of control
than for those with a more external locus of control, i.e.,
∂2λ∗(s,loc)
∂s∂loc > 0. Our objective is to
adopt a straightforward, parsimonious speciﬁcation of the relationship between individuals’
beliefs about the job arrival rate and the degree to which they have an internal locus of
control which is consistent with this assumption. Consequently, we model individuals’
subjective beliefs about arrival rates as λ∗(s,loc) = λ(s)f(loc), with f0(loc) > 0.
If a job-seeker receives no job oﬀer at time t, he or she continues searching. If, however,
a job oﬀer with wage w is received, he or she accepts that job oﬀer so long as the cor-
responding discounted expected utility associated with being hired at that wage (Ve(w))
exceeds the discounted expected utility (Vu) of remaining unemployed and continuing to
search. The reservation wage φ deﬁnes the stopping rule and corresponds to the wage oﬀer
for which Vu = Ve(φ) implying that every wage oﬀer above φ will be accepted while every
wage oﬀer below φ will be rejected.
More speciﬁcally, the utilities associated with accepting a job oﬀer and with continued















+(1 − λ(s)f(loc)dt)Vu] (2)
5For a description of job search models see for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) or Cahuc and
Zylberberg (2004). An overview of the empirical research is given by Eckstein and van den Berg (2007).
6In other words, we measure locus of control such that higher values of loc are associated with a more
internal locus of control.
5where r is the real instantaneous rate of interest, dt describes a short interval of time t,
and the job separation rate is q. The discounted expected utility of being hired is equal
to the income received in the period (wdt) plus the discounted expected future income
stream. With probability (1 − qdt) this is Ve(w) and with probability qdt this is Vu. The
discounted expected utility of continuing to search is the net income ((b−c(s))dt) received
in the period plus the discounted expected utility of receiving a future job oﬀer. Taken
together the discounted expected utilities associated with being unemployed (Vu) and with
being hired at wage w (Ve(w)) implicitly deﬁne the reservation wage for a given search
eﬀort s. In particular, using equations (1) and (2) we can show that the reservation wage
oﬀer φ at which Vu = Ve(φ) is given by





(w − φ)dF(w). (3)
Unemployed individuals choose both their search eﬀort s and reservation wage φ so as
to maximize their discounted expected utility Vu over an inﬁnite horizon. Substituting the
constraint that Vu − Ve(φ) = 0 into this optimization problem, we can show that optimal
search behavior is determined by the maximization of Vu = φ/r with respect to s. This
implies that we can solve for the optimal search eﬀort s∗ by diﬀerentiating the relation






(w − φ)dF(w). (4)
Equation (4) implies that individuals choose their optimal search eﬀort by equating the
marginal cost of job search with the marginal beneﬁts associated with additional search,
i.e., an increased probability of receiving a job oﬀer paying more than their reservation
wage.
Combining equations (3) and (4) we can solve for individuals’ reservation wage at the
optimal level of search s∗ as follows:




Reservation wages are increasing in unemployment beneﬁts and the job oﬀer arrival rate,
but decreasing in the costs of job search. Finally, higher marginal search costs raise reser-
vation wages, while reservation wages are lower the greater is the marginal eﬀect of job
search on the job oﬀer arrival rate.
We now consider the eﬀect that individuals’ beliefs about the oﬀer arrival rate have
on their optimal search behavior. In particular, we are interested in the eﬀect of a change
in individuals’ locus of control on φ and s∗. It can be shown that individuals who have a
more internal locus of control, i.e., those who believe that their own eﬀorts have relatively
large eﬀects on future outcomes, have higher reservation wages and search more intensively







6See Appendix B for details.7 The implications are quite intuitive. Conditional on search
intensity, individuals with a highly internal locus of control expect more future job oﬀers.
For them remaining unemployed and waiting for new job oﬀers has a higher expected
utility, which leads to a higher reservation wage. For a given amount of search and a
speciﬁc reservation wage, the subjective marginal returns of search are also higher for
individuals with a highly internal locus of control. So, in order to equalize marginal returns
and marginal costs of search, they search more.
For simplicity, the model is based on the assumption that the locus of control is stable
over time, i.e., that the unemployment duration itself does not have any impact on f(loc)
and that individuals do not update their beliefs about the impact of their search eﬀort on
the probability of receiving a job oﬀer. This simplifying assumption allows us to maintain
tractability and focus attention on the key relationships of interest. In the empirical anal-
ysis, we analyze the eﬀect of locus of control on job search behavior by comparing only
individuals who are at the same point in the unemployment spell. Thus, our estimates
are unaﬀected by any subsequent updating of beliefs as individuals’ unemployment spells
progress.
2.2 Locus of Control as a Measure of Ability
Thus far we have assumed that locus of control aﬀects individuals’ search behavior through
their perceptions of the eﬀect of job search on the probability of ﬁnding a job. Speciﬁcally,
we have assumed that
∂λ∗(s∗,loc)
∂s∗ is higher for those with a more internal locus of control
than for those with a more external locus of control. In short, individuals with an internal
locus of control have a higher subjective probability of receiving a job oﬀer at any given
level of search intensity because they believe the payoﬀ to search is higher.
The predictions of this model can be compared to an alternative model in which locus of
control is a component of overall ability. Individuals with an internal locus of control may
simply be more productive and therefore have a higher expected probability of receiving
a job oﬀer, perhaps because they believe that potential employers can observe their locus
of control by interviewing them.8 We consider this possibility by specifying an alternative
model in which the relationship between job oﬀer arrivals and an individual’s locus of
control is given by λa(s,loc) = λ(s) + f(loc) with f0(loc) > 0. In this case, individuals
with an internal locus of control have a higher probability of receiving a job oﬀer for any
given search intensity because they are more productive.9
In contrast to the above model, the expected eﬀect of search on the probability of
7These implications correspond to the theoretical results given by van den Berg and van der Klaauw
(2006). They show in the context of a job search model with multiple search channels that an increase in
search productivity—which corresponds to an increase in the subjective returns to search in our model—
leads to a higher reservation wage and an increase in search eﬀort.
8The implications are the same for a model in which individuals with an internal locus of control are
more able to generate a wage oﬀer above their reservation wage because they search more eﬀectively.
9Note that the probability of receiving a job oﬀer above the reservation wage is given by: (λ(s) +
f(loc))
R ∞




λ(s) )Ve(w)dF(w). Consequently, our model in which an internal
locus of control increases the oﬀer arrival rate is equivalent to a model in which individuals who have an
internal locus of control receive higher wage oﬀers.











(w − φ)dF(w). (7)
Reservation wages are given by:







(w − φ)dF(w). (8)
Unlike the case when locus of control operates through beliefs about the payoﬀ to ad-
ditional search eﬀort (see equation (4)), here an individual’s locus of control aﬀects his
or her optimal search level only through the eﬀect that it has on his or her reservation
wage φ. Reservation wages are higher the more internal an individual’s locus of control is
because, for a given search eﬀort s∗, the probability of receiving an acceptable job oﬀer
is higher. Given this framework, it can be shown that, in contrast to the previous model,
when an internal locus of control results in a higher job oﬀer arrival rate independent of
the search eﬀort, individuals with a more internal locus of control are expected to search







See Appendix B for details. The intuition behind the reservation wage result is the same as
before. For a given search eﬀort, remaining unemployed and waiting for new job oﬀers has
a higher expected utility for individuals with a highly internal locus of control leading them
to have a higher reservation wage. In contrast to the previous model, here the marginal
returns to search are independent of the locus of control. Instead, as a result of the higher
reservation wage, the expected marginal returns to search evaluated at a given search
intensity are lower for individuals with a highly internal locus of control. This leads to a
lower optimal search intensity for them.10
Having a more internal locus of control has an ambiguous eﬀect on the length of time
an individual spends being unemployed irrespective of the model considered. In particu-
lar, the expected unemployment duration is given by Tu = 1/[λ(s∗)(1 − F(φ)]. Having a
more internal locus of control increases the reservation wage in both models which tends
to increase the duration of unemployment. When locus of control is related to subjective
beliefs about the payoﬀ to search, individuals with a highly internal locus of control search
more, which leads to a higher job arrival rate and decreases the time spent in unemploy-
ment. In the simple ability model, those with an internal locus of control search less, but
have a higher probability of receiving a job oﬀer. Neither model implies a clear prediction
on the impact of the locus of control on unemployment duration. This underscores the
importance of observing job search behavior directly.
10The ability model and its implications are similar to the one presented by Fougere, Pradel, and Roger
(2009). In their study the unemployed workers receive job oﬀers via own search and via public employment
service (PES), the latter is costless and independent of own search eﬀort. They show that search eﬀort is
a decreasing function of the exogenous PES rate of job contacts, similar to our results with search being
a decreasing function of the locus of control.
83 The IZA Evaluation Data Set
The data come from the IZA Evaluation Data Set which targets a sample of individuals
entering unemployment between June 2007 and May 2008. In particular, from the monthly
unemployment inﬂows of approximately 206,000 individuals identiﬁed in the administra-
tive records, a nine percent random sample is selected for interview. These individuals
constitute the gross sample from which representative samples of approximately 1,450 in-
dividuals are interviewed each month, so that after one year twelve monthly cohorts are
gathered. These survey data are then matched to administrative employment records of
the Public Employment Services.11 The IZA Evaluation Data Set is ideal for our purposes
because individuals are interviewed shortly after they become unemployed and are asked
a variety of non-standard questions about attitudes, expectations, and diﬀerent person-
ality traits including locus of control (see Caliendo et al., 2009, for details). Unlike other
researchers, we are able to compare a large number of individuals with similar, short un-
employment durations which reduces concerns about the potential for reverse causality
to aﬀect the analysis. Moreover, access to administrative data on employment histories
including previous wages and time spent in employment allows us to carefully control for
diﬀerences in human capital endowments which aﬀect individuals’ reservation wages and
the likelihood of receiving a job oﬀer.
We restrict our sample to individuals who are 16 to 54 years old, and who receive or are
eligible to receive unemployment beneﬁts.12 In wave 1, 17,396 interviews were completed
with individuals each of whom had begun an unemployment spell approximately two
months earlier. We restrict our analysis to individuals who were still unemployed and
actively searching for a job at the time of interview. That is, we exclude individuals who
had already found a job or were not searching for other reasons. We further exclude those
individuals whose reported hourly reservation wages and beneﬁt levels were in the lowest
or highest percentile of the distribution and who had missing values in key variables. This
leaves us with an estimation sample of roughly 7,900 individuals.
3.1 Measuring Locus of Control
We measure an individual’s locus of control using his or her responses to ten separate items
from the Rotter (1966) scale. Locus of control refers to a general expectation about internal
versus external control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1966). People with a more external locus
of control believe that much of what happens in life is beyond their control, while people
with an internal locus of control see life’s outcomes as dependent on their own decisions and
behavior. Psychologists argue that these beliefs are central to understanding a person’s
motivation and the way that he or she makes decisions and sets goals. Those with an
external locus of control are more likely to avoid situations in which they feel unable to
11For those individuals who gave us their permission we are able to link the survey data with adminis-
trative records based on the ‘Integrated Labour Market Biographies’ of the Public Employment Services,
containing relevant register data from four sources: employment history, unemployment support recipience,
participation in active labor market programs, and job seeker history.
12To generate a claim for unemployment beneﬁts workers have to be employed for at least 12 months in
the last three years before entering unemployment.
9cope, while those with an internal locus of control tend to set higher goals, persevere in
challenging situations, and be more likely to achieve successful outcomes (Strauser, Ketz,
and Keim, 2002).
The ten separate items underlying the Rotter scale are summarized in Table 1. For
each item respondents were asked to answer on a scale from ‘1: I do not agree at all’ to
‘7: I fully agree’. As a ﬁrst step in creating a measure of individuals’ locus of control,
we used factor analysis to identify the number of common factors underlying our ten
items. Our factor analysis (see upper part of Figure 1) indicated that items 1, 6 and 9
load onto one factor (interpretable as ‘internal’), while items 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 load
onto another factor (interpretable as ‘external’). Item 4 did not load on to either factor
and was discarded. We conducted a parallel factor analysis for a representative sample
of respondents in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, see lower part of Figure 1).
We found that these ten items load onto two factors in exactly the same way in the two
samples indicating that our distinction between internal and external control is not speciﬁc
to unemployed individuals, but rather is representative of the German population more
generally. Consequently, we use this factorization to create separate indexes of internal
and external locus of control. At the same time, our theoretical model is consistent with
the early psychological literature in conceptualizing internal and external locus of control
as being opposite ends of the same spectrum (see Rotter, 1966). Moreover, Rotter (1975)
argues that factor analysis in and of itself is not useful in identifying whether the true
structure of locus of control is uni- or multi-dimensional. Therefore, we also construct a
single index of locus of control which combines both the internal and external indexes.13
In the ﬁrst step we standardize each item by subtracting the mean and dividing by the
standard deviation. In a second step we construct the corresponding average of the items.
This gives us indexes with a mean 0 and a variance 1.
The distribution of each of these measures is given in Figure 2. In later analysis, we also
use these indexes to distinguish people with an internal as opposed to an external locus of
control. In each case, the threshold is set at approximately 50 percent of the distribution.
Insert Table 1 about here
Insert Figures 1, 2 about here
Table 2 compares the demographic, human capital, and personality characteristics of
individuals with an internal as opposed to external locus of control based on the joint
index. Women, immigrants, married individuals, and older workers are signiﬁcantly more
likely than others to believe that much of what happens in life is outside their control.
Having higher educational attainment on the other hand is associated with a more internal
locus of control. Interestingly, there also appears to be a relationship between personality
traits and locus of control. Those with an internal locus of control report signiﬁcantly
higher levels of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and signiﬁcantly lower levels
of neuroticism. These diﬀerences imply that it will be important to carefully control for
13Piatek and Pinger (2009) also extract a single factor when measuring locus of control in the SEOP
data.
10individual characteristics when evaluating the eﬀects of locus of control on job search
outcomes.
Insert Tables 2 about here
One of the advantages of the IZA Evaluation Data Set is that we have detailed in-
formation about individuals’ previous labor market experiences making it apparent that
those with an internal locus of control have somewhat more favorable employment his-
tories. Those with an internal locus of control, for example, are signiﬁcantly less likely
to have entered unemployment from employment (or subsidized employment) and are
signiﬁcantly more likely to have entered from education or other pathways. Since turn-
ing 18, those with an internal locus of control have spent on average 0.71 months per
year in unemployment, while those with an external locus of control have spend 0.85
months per year being unemployed. Moreover, an internal locus of control is associated
with signiﬁcantly higher months in employment in the years before entering unemploy-
ment, higher pre-unemployment wages and therefore also higher unemployment beneﬁts.
These relationships are consistent with previous evidence that having an internal locus of
control is correlated with labor market success (Andrisani, 1977, 1981; Osborne Groves,
2005; Semykina and Linz, 2007; Duncan and Dunifon, 1998). In terms of intergenerational
transmission we see that having a father with A-level qualiﬁcations or an employed father
at age 15 is associated with a more internal locus of control. Finally, individuals with an
internal locus of control are also signiﬁcantly more likely to have access to a number of
communication modes including mobile phones, computers, the internet, and e-mail. This,
along with their advantaged employment history, is expected to facilitate job search.
Importantly, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences across the two groups in either the
month of entry into the sample or in the period between entry and ﬁrst interview which
is consistent with random sample selection.
3.2 Locus of Control and Job Search Behavior
Table 3 provides information about the reservation wages and search strategies for individ-
uals in our sample. The results indicate that people with an internal locus of control have
higher reservation wages and send out more job applications. In particular, those with an
internal locus of control report a reservation wage of e7.72/hour on average, while those
with an external locus of control have a reservation wage that is on average e0.39 lower.
Individuals with an internal locus of control use slightly more search channels on average,
but this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.14 Finally, individuals who believe that much of what
happens in life is under their own control search more intensively sending out nearly two
(11 percent) additional applications on average than individuals who think that events are
outside their control. The corresponding distributions of the reservation wage and and the
search intensity are reported in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
Insert Table 3 about here
14McGee (2010) argues that the number of search channels might be an inadequate measure of search
intensity since this does not capture the search intensity within each channel.
11Interestingly, individuals with an internal locus of control are more optimistic about
their chances of ﬁnding a job in the next period despite having higher reservation wages.
Fully, 56 percent of those with an internal locus of control report that it is very likely
that they will take up a job within the next six months, while only 42 percent of those
with an external locus of control report the same. This degree of optimism is perhaps
not surprising given that those with an internal locus of control also have more favorable
job histories and are less likely to be in a disadvantaged labor market group (i.e. women,
migrants, low educated).
4 Estimation Approach and Results
Our interest is in understanding whether individuals’ beliefs about the extent to which
they control life’s outcomes aﬀect the way they search for jobs. We are particularly inter-
ested in understanding whether any eﬀect of locus of control operates through individuals’
perceptions of the return to their own search eﬀorts or solely as a dimension of ability.
Our strategy to discriminate between these two alternative explanations is twofold: First,
we directly analyze the eﬀect of locus of control on individuals’ beliefs about the proba-
bility of receiving an acceptable job oﬀer. This allows us to assess whether those with an
internal locus of control do in fact perceive a higher return to their job search investments.
Second, we formally test the empirical predictions of the two competing models discussed
in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 using both OLS and propensity score matching methods.
4.1 The Probability of Finding a Job
Coleman and Deleire (2003) conclude that locus of control aﬀects individuals’ education
decisions primarily by altering their expectations regarding the return to investments in
human capital. If a similar process operates here, we should expect to see a relationship
between a person’s locus of control and the return that he or she expects from greater
search eﬀort. We test this by using probit regression to estimate the eﬀect of search
intensity (as measured by the number of applications submitted) on the likelihood that
an individual believes the probability that he or she will receive an acceptable job oﬀer
is ‘very high’.15 Our model includes controls for the number of applications submitted,
one of two diﬀerent indicators for whether or not the individual has an internal locus of
control, and the interaction between them.16 This interaction term allows the relationship
between search intensity and the perceived pay oﬀ of job search (i.e. the probability of
ﬁnding a job) to diﬀer between those with an internal locus of control and those without.
We then estimate the model separately with and without controls for other personality
15Probit estimation on the probability that an individual believes getting a job is ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’
and OLS estimation on all four response categories lead to very similar results.
16Speciﬁcally, we use two indicator variables to identify those with an internal locus of control using 1)
the full index and 2) the internal index. Individuals are coded as having an internal locus of control on
these measures if they score higher than average on the corresponding standardized index. The full index is
used in models 1 and 2, while models 3 and 4 control for internal and external locus of control separately.
12traits (i.e. openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism).17
Insert Table 4 about here
The main results in Table 418 show that the eﬀect of an additional application on the
belief that one is ‘very likely’ to receive a job oﬀer is signiﬁcantly higher amongst those
with an internal locus of control. In particular, the marginal eﬀect of search intensity in
terms of one additional application is 0.2 (columns 1 and 2) percentage points higher for
those individuals with an internal locus of control. These results are based on our full index
which treats internal and external locus of control as opposite ends of the same spectrum.
When we control for individuals’ internal and external locus of control separately (see
columns 3 and 4), we ﬁnd that the marginal eﬀect of additional search on the expected
probability of getting a job continues to be 0.01 percentage points higher for those with a
highly internal locus of control. Moreover, the marginal eﬀect of additional search on the
reemployment probability is 0.1 percentage points lower for those with a highly external
locus of control. Having an internal locus of control therefore appears to be associated
with the belief that there is a higher return (in terms of reemployment probabilities) to
investments in job search. This suggests that locus of control may inﬂuence economic
decisions by aﬀecting the perceived returns to various sorts of investments. Individuals,
however, simultaneously choose their search eﬀort and their reservation wage both of which
aﬀect the expected probability of ﬁnding an acceptable job. Consequently, this analysis—
while suggestive—does not allow us to test the diﬀerent implications of the two models
directly. We turn to this issue below.19
4.2 Reservation Wages and Search Intensity
4.2.1 OLS Estimation
We begin by using OLS regression to estimate the eﬀect of locus of control on both
reservation wages and the number of applications that each individual has submitted.
Using OLS allows us to include our internal and external indexes separately, but restricts
us to controlling for diﬀerences in other characteristics in a linear, parametric way. We
consider two speciﬁcations: one without and one with controls for other personality traits.
Table 5 summarizes the main OLS results, full estimation results are available in Tables
A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
Insert Table 5 about here
We ﬁnd that reservation wages increase as individuals’ locus of control becomes more
internal everything else equal (see upper part of Table 5). Speciﬁcally, a one standard
17The model also includes controls for demographic characteristics, human capital endowments, and
previous employment histories.
18Full estimation results are available in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
19It is also interesting that, in models 1 and 2, the overall number of applications submitted is negatively
related to the probability that an individual believes ﬁnding a job is very likely. This seems to point to
some reverse causality highlighting the correlational nature of the estimates. Full results are available upon
request.
13deviation increase in the extent to which an individual has an internal locus of control is
associated with a 1.3-1.9 percent increase in his or her reservation wage. The magnitude
of these eﬀects are consistent with McGee (2010) who ﬁnds that a one standard deviation
increase in internality is associated with a 2.0 percent increase in young unemployed men’s
ﬁrst reported reservation wage and with a 1.3 percent increase in reservation wages over
all. It is important to note that this eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant and is net of a number of
other variables (e.g. human capital characteristics, employment history, etc.) which serve to
control for disparity in individuals’ ability. Moreover, inclusion of the external and internal
indexes separately makes it clear that this overall eﬀect is mainly driven by the degree to
which one believes that he or she is unable to control future outcomes (i.e. has a relatively
strong external locus of control). Speciﬁcally, a standard deviation increase in the extent
to which one has an external locus of control is associated with a 2.4 percent decrease in
reservation wages. This eﬀect becomes becomes somewhat smaller (2.0 percent) once we
control for an individual’s personality traits, but remains strongly signiﬁcant. Contrary
to expectations, the extent to which an individual has an internal locus of control is also
associated with a small, but signiﬁcant, reduction in reservation wages once we control for
personality traits and external locus of control (see column 4).
Individuals with a more internal locus of control also search for jobs more intensively
(see lower part of Table 5). Each standard deviation increase in the degree to which an
individual sees life’s events as under his or her own control results in the submission of
0.8 (approximately 5.3 percent) additional job applications. Unlike the case of reservation
wages, this eﬀect is driven by the degree to which one has an internal locus of control.
When both the internal and external indexes are included as separate factors (rather
than opposite ends of the same scale) we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in
the internal index is associated with the submission of an additional 1.5 (approximately
9.4 percent) applications. In comparison, McGee (2010) estimates that a one standard
deviation increase in internality increases the hours of job search by more than 19 percent,
but has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of search methods utilized. This diversity of
results across alternative measures of search intensity indicates that individuals’ locus of
control may aﬀect not only how intensively they search for new jobs, but also the way
they go about ﬁnding them. Finally, as before, the magnitude of our locus of control eﬀect
falls once we control for personality traits indicating a correlation between an individual’s
locus of control and dimensions of his or her personality. Although the full index remains
positive, it is no longer signiﬁcant. The internal index, however, continues to have a large,
positive eﬀect on the number of job applications submitted.
4.2.2 Propensity Score Matching
In order to improve the eﬃciency and precision of our estimates we also use propensity
score matching (PSM) to assess the impact of the locus of control on job search behavior.
The primary motivation for applying PSM in this context is to make internal and external
individuals as comparable as possible in all other characteristics so that we can more
14directly compare diﬀerences in their search behavior.20
To this end, we use the three locus of control indexes deﬁned above to create binary
indicator variables to categorize individuals into two groups based on their locus of control.
Speciﬁcally, individuals are coded as having a highly internal locus of control (internal =
1) if they have a higher than average score on the full index and are coded as not having an
internal locus of control (internal = 0) otherwise. We then use our internal index to create
a second indicator of internality to separate individuals who score above average versus
below average on this scale. Finally, we use our external index to distinguish between
individuals who have a higher than average degree of externality (external = 1) from
those who do not (external = 0). This leaves us with two groups (‘high’ vs ‘low’) for
each index. We then use these three indicator variables to estimate three separate logit
models of the probability of being classiﬁed as either ‘internal’ or ‘external’ (see Table
A.4 in Appendix A). As before we consider two speciﬁcations; one with (columns 4-6
in Table A.4) and one without (columns 1-3) other personality traits. In order to focus
on the eﬀect of locus of control we need to include as many relevant variables in our
model as possible. In addition to socio-demographic information, we also include human
capital, personality characteristics and intergenerational variables (analogous to our OLS
estimation in Tables A.2 and A.3). Based on these estimations we predict the propensity
scores (e.g. the probability of having an internal locus of control) and use these scores in the
subsequent matching process. Figure A.2 shows the distribution of the propensity scores
in the diﬀerent groups. For example, the ﬁrst row shows the propensity score distribution
based on the full index. Individuals who are more internal are depicted in the upper half
of each graph, individuals who are more external are depicted in the lower half. Looking
at the speciﬁcation without other personality traits on the left hand side shows that
the distribution in both groups is quite similar. However, if we include other personality
traits the distribution becomes more unequal (see right hand side). This highlights the
importance of respecting the common support region, i.e., comparing only ‘comparable’
individuals.
Insert Table 6 about here
Propensity score matching results are presented in Table 6.21 Concentrating ﬁrst on
the internal-external distinction based on the full index, we ﬁnd that people who are more
internal have much higher reservation wages. If we do not control for the other personality
traits the marginal eﬀect of being internal is 3.2 percent; controlling for personality traits
reduces the eﬀect slightly to 2.7 percent. These eﬀects are both strongly signiﬁcant and
economically important. Moreover, the matching statistics show that the matching proce-
dure was very successful in balancing the distribution of covariates in both groups. To be
more speciﬁc, the mean and median standardized diﬀerences (biasaft and mdbaft) in the
covariates after matching are reduced to below 1.5 (and even 1.0 in most of the cases).
20See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) or Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for more details on the method.
21Results presented here a based on a kernel matching algorithm with an epanechnikov kernel function,
a bandwidth of 0.06 and common support; standard errors are based on 100 bootstrap replications. Results
are not sensitive to the choice of the matching algorithm. Sensitivity analysis are available on request from
the authors.
15Consideration of our internal and external locus of control indexes makes it clear that
our results are driven by the eﬀect of an external locus of control in reducing reservation
wages rather than an internal locus of control in increasing them. Consistent with the
OLS results, we ﬁnd a strong negative impact of being external (ranging from 4.4 to 2.7
percent) on reservation wages, whereas there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the reservation
wages of those who do and do not score higher than average on the internal index. This
suggests that previous studies which use a one-dimensional locus of control measure to
link self-eﬃcacy to human capital investments generally (Coleman and Deleire, 2003; Cebi,
2007) and job search in particular (McGee, 2010) may be somewhat misleading.
Individuals with a more internal locus of control also submit more applications ev-
erything else equal. In this case, the eﬀect stems from a positive eﬀect of an internal
locus of control on the submission of applications rather than from a negative eﬀect of an
external locus of control. When we do not control for personality, people who are more
internal (based on the full index) submit an additional 1.1 applications. Once we account
for diﬀerences in individuals’ personality traits the eﬀects remains positive but becomes
insigniﬁcant. Separating our joint index into its two speciﬁc components indicates that—
unlike the case for reservation wages—it is the extent to which one has an internal locus
of control that is most closely related to search intensity. People who are more internal
(based on the internal index) submit between 2.4 and 3.0 more applications.
Overall, the propensity score matching results conﬁrm our OLS results and internal
locus of control does not have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on reservation wages any longer.
This is reassuring, since we allow here for non-linearities in the outcome equation and more
importantly assign diﬀerent weights to each individual. Whereas OLS assigns all individ-
uals the same weight in the estimation, the matching procedure allows a ﬁner comparison
between individuals in diﬀerent categories by adjusting for diﬀerences in the distribution
of covariates in a more eﬃcient way (see, e.g., Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2007).
5 Conclusions
Designing sensible public policy to assist unemployed individuals requires that we know
more about their own job search decisions. In particular, why do some unemployed in-
dividuals invest more than others in ﬁnding new employment? Does believing that life’s
events are outside one’s control lead to a relative lack of search eﬀort? If so, can we design
policies to promote self-eﬃcacy among the unemployed?
This paper analyzes the link between individuals’ locus of control and their decisions to
invest in job search. We advance standard job search theory by developing a search model
which incorporates individuals’ subjective beliefs about the eﬀect of their job search eﬀort
on the job oﬀer arrival rate. This subjective belief depends on individuals’ locus of control,
i.e., the extent to which one believes that his or her actions aﬀect future outcomes. We
empirically estimate the impact of locus of control on job search behavior using novel linked
survey and administrative data for a large sample of newly-unemployed Germans. We ﬁnd
that having an internal locus of control is associated with the belief that investments in
job search have a higher payoﬀ in terms of reemployment probabilities. Moreover, those
16who believe that they have control over what happens in their lives set higher reservation
wages and search more intensively than those who feel little control over their lives. Taken
together, these results are consistent with a model of job search in which locus of control
aﬀects individuals’ subjective beliefs about the oﬀer arrival rate, but is inconsistent with
a job search model in which locus of control is a dimension of ability.
These results advance our understanding of the role that individuals’ self-eﬃcacy plays
in human capital investments generally, and job search in particular. At the same time,
there are a number of challenges yet to be resolved. In particular, there is considerable
divergence of results across uni- versus multi-dimensional notions of locus of control and
alternative measures of search intensity (see McGee, 2010). It is important, therefore, to
continue to reﬁne our economic models of investment behavior to take these complexities
into account. Moreover, there is a need for additional empirical research which estimates
these key relationships for diﬀerent labor market groups across a number of countries so
that we can begin to understand how the institutional arrangements underpinning the
unemployment beneﬁts system might interact with individuals’ sense of self-eﬃcacy in
driving job search. Finally, it would be useful to incorporate locus of control into dynamic
models of the job search process. This would allow us to begin to understand the way that
individuals’ self-eﬃcacy evolves over time in response to labor market events.
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Table 1: Components of Locus of Control
Variable Mean SD Median
N 7896
Components of Locus of Control (1: I do not agree at all, 7: I agree fully)
(a)
Q1. How my life takes course is entirely dependent on me 6.08 (1.27) [7.00]
Q2. Compared to others, I have not achieved what I deserved 3.63 (1.94) [4.00]
Q3. What one achieves is, in the ﬁrst instance, a question of destiny and luck 3.45 (1.93) [3.00]




Q5. I often experience that others make decisions about my life 2.82 (1.86) [2.00]
Q6. Success is gained through hard work 6.26 (1.15) [7.00]
Q7. When I encounter diﬃculties in life, I often doubt my abilities 3.37 (1.86) [3.00]
Q8. The possibilities I have in life are dependent on social circumstances 4.49 (1.66) [5.00]
Q9. More important than all eﬀorts is to exercise one’s own abilities 5.24 (1.40) [5.00]
Q10. I have little control over things which happen in my life 2.67 (1.78) [2.00]
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
(a) Individuals were asked the following question: “The following statements characterize diﬀerent attitudes towards life
and the future. To what extent do you personally agree with these statements? Please answer on the basis of a scale
of 1 to 7.”
(b) This item is observed for only 7,858 individuals.
All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise; p-value refers to a two-sided t-test of mean equality between both
groups.






West Germany 0.69 0.68 0.66
Female 0.53 0.48 0.00
German citizenship 0.94 0.96 0.00
Age 36.80 34.42 0.00
Married (or cohabiting) 0.41 0.38 0.00
One Child 0.19 0.19 0.82
Two (or more) Children 0.15 0.14 0.23
School Leaving Degree
None, Special needs, other 0.03 0.02 0.02
Lower Secondary School 0.32 0.26 0.00
Middle Secondary School 0.42 0.44 0.05
Specialized upper Secondary School 0.23 0.28 0.00
Employment History
Months in Unemployment (div. by age-18) 0.85 0.71 0.00
Months in Employment (div. by age-18) 8.20 8.16 0.80
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) 0.79 0.80 0.34
Level of Unemployment Beneﬁt in e/month (missings=0) 503.15 548.86 0.00
Employment status before Unemployment
Employed 0.67 0.65 0.06
Subsidized Employment 0.07 0.06 0.22
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. 0.12 0.18 0.00
Maternity Leave 0.05 0.05 0.63
Other 0.09 0.06 0.00
Months in regular employment in Year t − x Before Unemployment
t-1 6.71 6.75 0.71
t-2 6.47 6.73 0.03
t-3 6.06 6.28 0.07
Ln(Wage) in Euro in Year t − x Before Unemployment
t-1 2.81 2.77 0.31
t-2 2.63 2.67 0.33
t-3 2.41 2.46 0.27
Other Personality Traits and Intergenerational Transmission
Big-5 (7 = completely applies, 1 = does not apply)
(b)
Openness 4.96 5.07 0.00
Conscientiousness 6.13 6.39 0.00
Extraversion 5.48 5.86 0.00
Neuroticism 4.56 3.85 0.00
Intergenerational: Father has A-Level qualiﬁcations?
Not known 0.06 0.06 0.54
Yes 0.14 0.16 0.03
No 0.80 0.79 0.12
Intergenerational: Father in employment when interviewee was 15 years old?
Not known (or already dead) 0.11 0.10 0.24
Yes 0.84 0.85 0.07
No 0.06 0.05 0.19
Other Variables
Available Means of communication:
Landline Phone 0.86 0.85 0.86
Mobile 0.91 0.95 0.00
Computer 0.83 0.87 0.00
Printer 0.75 0.79 0.00
Internet 0.73 0.78 0.00
Email 0.70 0.77 0.00
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
Note: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise; p-value refers to a two-sided t-test of mean equality between
both groups. Descriptive statistics for all variables are available on request from the authors.
(a) The ‘Full Index’ aggregates all standardized answers in the following way: “Q1 + Q6 + Q9 - (Q2 + Q3 + Q5 + Q7
+ Q8 + Q10)” (see also Figure 1). Individuals are coded as having an internal (external) locus of control if they score
higher (lower) than average on the standardized index.
(b) The ﬁfth BIG-5 item “agreeableness” is not observed for all of the individuals.Table 3: Job Search Behavior by Locus of Control
Variable Full Index t-test
External Internal p-value
N 3940 3956
Hourly Reservation Wage (in Euro) 7.33 7.72 0.00
Log(Reservation Wage) 1.94 1.99 0.00
Number of Search Channels (Mean) 5.10 5.11 0.72
Number of Own Applications (Mean) 14.96 16.68 0.00
0 0.06 0.04 0.00
1-4 0.21 0.19 0.09
5-9 0.21 0.21 0.88
10-19 0.25 0.25 0.59
20-29 0.14 0.15 0.31
30+ 0.14 0.16 0.00
Expected probability of ﬁnding a job in the next 6 month
(1=very probable, 4=very improbable)
(a) 1.78 1.58 0.00
very probable 0.42 0.56 0.00
probable 0.42 0.34 0.00
improbable 0.12 0.07 0.00
very improbable 0.04 0.03 0.10
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
Note: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise; p-value refers to a two-sided t-test of mean
equality between both groups.
(a) This information is observed for 3,539 individuals with external locus of control and 3,566 indi-
viduals with internal locus of control.
Table 4: Probit Estimation Results: Probability of Finding a Job is Very High (Marginal Eﬀects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Own Applications -.001
∗∗∗ -.002
∗∗∗ -.0005 -.0006
Number of Own Applications x LOC (Full Index, Dummy) 0.002
∗∗∗ 0.002
∗∗∗
Number of Own Applications x LOC (Internal Index, Dummy) 0.0009
∗ 0.001
∗
Number of Own Applications x LOC (External Index, Dummy) -.001
∗∗∗ -.001
∗∗∗
Full Index (Standardized) 0.063
∗∗∗ 0.052
∗∗∗
Internal Index (Standardized) 0.042
∗∗∗ 0.03
∗∗∗




(a) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Including Other Personality Traits
(b) No Yes No Yes
Obs. 7105 7105 7105 7105
Pseudo R-2 0.084 0.089 0.084 0.09
log-Likelihood -4510.948 -4483.402 -4509.012 -4482.807
Note: ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. Indices are standardized in the following way: Indexst
i =
(Indexi − Mean(Index))/SD(Index).
(a) Full estimation results are available in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
(b) Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism.
22Table 5: OLS Estimation Results: Log(Reservation Wage and Search Intensity (Num-
ber of Own Applications)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(A) Log Reservation Wage
Full Index (Standardized) 0.019
∗∗∗ 0.013
∗∗∗
Internal Index (Standardized) -.002 -.006
∗
External Index (Standardized) -.024
∗∗∗ -.020
∗∗∗
Obs. 7896 7896 7896 7896
Adjusted R-2 0.310 0.315 0.311 0.316
(B) Search Intensity (Number of Own Applications)
Full Index (Standardized) 0.840
∗∗∗ 0.304
Internal Index (Standardized) 1.482
∗∗∗ 1.031
∗∗∗
External Index (Standardized) -.160 0.241
Obs. 7896 7896 7896 7896
Adjusted R-2 0.022 0.027 0.025 0.028
Including Control Variables
(a) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Including Other Personality Traits
(b) No Yes No Yes
Note: ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. Indices are standardized in the following
way: Indexst
i = (Indexi − Mean(Index))/SD(Index).
(a) Full estimation results are available in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
(b) Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism.
Table 6: Propensity Score Matching Results
Index PT






Outcome Variable: Log(Reservation Wage)
Full Index
a no 0.0321 0.0080 4.0126 3956 3940 0 0.6907 0.5559
yes 0.0273 0.0083 3.2801 3956 3940 14 0.9919 0.7486
Internal Index
b no -0.0012 0.0061 -0.1996 3860 4036 2 0.6647 0.4997
yes -0.0050 0.0077 -0.6526 3860 4036 1 1.3926 1.2231
External Index
c no -0.0439 0.0081 -5.4181 3975 3921 0 0.6463 0.4785
yes -0.0273 0.0091 -3.0103 3975 3921 2 0.8617 0.5841
Outcome Variable: Search Intensity
Full Index
a no 1.0601 0.4959 2.1374 3956 3940 0 0.6907 0.5559
yes 0.1726 0.5826 0.2962 3956 3940 14 0.9919 0.7486
Internal Index
b no 3.0245 0.5398 5.6034 3860 4036 2 0.6647 0.4997
yes 2.4024 0.6039 3.9779 3860 4036 1 1.3926 1.2231
External Index
c no -0.5025 0.5522 -0.9099 3975 3921 0 0.6463 0.4786
yes 0.0301 0.5674 0.0531 3975 3921 2 0.8617 0.5841
Note: Results presented here a based on a kernel matching algorithm with an epanechnikov kernel
function, a bandwidth of 0.06 and imposition of common support; standard errors are based on 100
bootstrap replications.
(a,b,c) Individuals are coded as having an internal locus of control if they score higher than average
on the standardized ‘Full Index’ and ‘Internal Index’. Individuals are coded as having an external
locus of control if they score higher than average on the standardized ‘External Index’. We compare
the ‘high’ and the ‘low’ groups within each index.
(1) The ﬁrst speciﬁcation does not include other personality traits as explanatory variables in the
propensity score estimation; the second speciﬁcation does (see Table A.4 for details and Figure A.2
for score distributions).
(2) TN and NT indicate the number of individuals in the ‘high’ and ‘low’ group; Oﬀ counts the number
of individuals outside the common support region. biasaft and mdbaft summarize the mean and
median standardized bias after matching.
23Figures
Figure 1: Factor Loadings of the LOC Variables
Our Sample
Representative Population Sample (SOEP)
Note: Factor 1 is interpreted as ‘External Locus of Control’;
Factor 2 as ‘Internal Locus of Control’.
(a) The ‘Internal Index’ aggregates the standardized answers in
the following way: “Q1 + Q6 + Q9”.
(b) The ‘External Index’ aggregates the standardized answers in
the following way: “Q2 + Q3 + Q5 + Q7 + Q8 + Q10”.
(c) Finally, the ‘Full Index’ aggregates all standardized answers
in the following way: “Q1 + Q6 + Q9 - (Q2 + Q3 + Q5 + Q7
+ Q8 + Q10)”.
The variable Q.4:“Social/Political engagement can change
things” loads on a third factor and is not used.
24Figure 2: Distribution of Alternate Locus of Control Indices
Note: See Figure 1 for a deﬁnition of the diﬀerent indices. In-
dices are standardized in the following way: Indexst
i = (Indexi −
Mean(Index))/SD(Index).
25A Supplementary Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Distribution of Reservation Wages and Number
of Applications by Locus of Control
Reservation Wage (Euro per Hour)
Search Intensity (Number of Applications)
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
People with internal (external) locus of control based on the ‘Full Index’
are depicted on the right (left) hand side.
26Figure A.2: Propensity Score Distribution
Propensity Score Estimation...
Without Other Personality Traits With Other Personality Traits
Full Index (High vs. Low)
Internal Index (High vs. Low)
External Index (High vs. Low)
Note: The speciﬁcation on the right hand side includes other personality traits (openness, conscien-
tiousness, extraversion, neuroticism), in the propensity score estimation whereas the speciﬁcation
on the left hand side does not. See Table A.4 for detailed estimation results.
27Table A.1: Probit Estimation Results: Probability of Finding a Job is Very High (Marginal
Eﬀects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Own Applications -.001∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗ -.0005 -.0006
Number of Own Applications x LOC (Full Index, Dummy) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Number of Own Applications x LOC (Internal Index, Dummy) 0.0009∗ 0.001∗
Number of Own Applications x LOC (External Index, Dummy) -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
Full Index (Standardized) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
Internal Index (Standardized) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗





West Germany 0.019 0.012 0.021 0.013
Female -.094∗∗∗ -.099∗∗∗ -.095∗∗∗ -.098∗∗∗
German citizenship -.035 -.028 -.035 -.028
Married (or cohabiting) -.057∗∗∗ -.054∗∗∗ -.058∗∗∗ -.055∗∗∗
Children
No Children
One Child 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
Two (or more) Children -.032 -.030 -.031 -.031
Age (17-24 years)
Age (25-34 years) 0.038∗ 0.035∗ 0.037∗ 0.034∗
Age (35-44 years) -.023 -.026 -.024 -.027
Age (45-55 years) -.145∗∗∗ -.146∗∗∗ -.146∗∗∗ -.147∗∗∗
School Leaving Degree
None, Special needs, other
Lower Secondary School 0.03 0.028 0.029 0.026
Middle Secondary School 0.043 0.04 0.046 0.041
Specialized upper Secondary School 0.066 0.064 0.072∗ 0.066
Vocational training None
Internal or external professional training, others 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.005
Technical college or university degree 0.016 0.02 0.02 0.022
Months in Unemployment (div. by age-18) -.024∗∗∗ -.023∗∗∗ -.024∗∗∗ -.023∗∗∗
Months in Employment (div. by age-18) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) -.013 -.010 -.014 -.010
Level of UB (log(ben+1),mis=0) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Employment status before Unemployment
Employed
Subsidized Employment -.030 -.030 -.030 -.030
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006
Maternity Leave -.165∗∗∗ -.165∗∗∗ -.164∗∗∗ -.165∗∗∗
Other -.071∗∗∗ -.067∗∗∗ -.071∗∗∗ -.068∗∗∗
Months in regular employment in
t-1 -.007∗∗∗ -.007∗∗∗ -.007∗∗∗ -.006∗∗∗
t-2 0.001 0.001 0.0008 0.0008
t-3 -.008∗∗∗ -.008∗∗∗ -.008∗∗∗ -.008∗∗∗
Ln(Wage) in Euro in
t-1 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
t-2 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
t-3 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
Intergenerational: Intergenerational: Father has A-level qualiﬁcations?
Not known
Yes -.014 -.019 -.015 -.021
No 0.002 -.002 0.001 -.003
Intergenerational: Father in employment when interviewee was 15 years old?
Not known (or already dead)
Yes -.002 0.0004 -.002 0.001
No -.019 -.012 -.017 -.012
Living Situation
Own appartement/house
Rent -.006 -.009 -.006 -.009
Subletting 0.048 0.046 0.047 0.046
Other 0.128 0.134 0.124 0.131
Without -.048 -.057 -.052 -.060
Available Means of Communication:
Landline Phone -.048∗∗ -.042∗∗ -.048∗∗ -.042∗∗
Personal Mobile Phone 0.047∗ 0.037 0.047∗ 0.037
Computer -.015 -.018 -.014 -.017
Printer -.034 -.032 -.033 -.032
Internet 0.012 0.015 0.01 0.013
Email 0.028 0.022 0.031 0.024
Local UE Rate at Interview (below 5%)
5-10% -.044∗∗ -.046∗∗ -.045∗∗ -.046∗∗
10-15% -.059∗∗ -.064∗∗ -.061∗∗ -.065∗∗∗
15+% -.112∗∗∗ -.117∗∗∗ -.113∗∗∗ -.118∗∗∗
Obs. 7105 7105 7105 7105
R-2 0.084 0.089 0.084 0.09
log-Likelihood -4510.948 -4483.402 -4509.012 -4482.807
Note: Additional control variables used in the estimation: Months of entry into unemployment (June 2007 - April 2008) and time
between entry and interview (in weeks). Full estimation results are available on request by the authors.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
28Table A.2: OLS Estimation Results: Log(Reservation Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Index (Standardized) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
Internal Index (Standardized) -.002 -.006∗






West Germany 0.143∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
Female -.111∗∗∗ -.108∗∗∗ -.109∗∗∗ -.108∗∗∗
German citizenship -.011 -.007 -.009 -.006
Married (or cohabiting) -.004 -.001 -.003 -.001
Children No Children (Reference cat.)
One Child 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
Two (or more) Children 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
Age (17-24 years)
Age (25-34 years) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
Age (35-44 years) 0.133∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
Age (45-55 years) 0.144∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
School Leaving Degree:
None, Special needs, other (ref.)
Lower Secondary School 0.039∗ 0.039∗ 0.037∗ 0.038∗
Middle Secondary School 0.05∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.045∗∗
Specialized upper Secondary School 0.132∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
Vocational training
None (ref.)
Internal or external professional training, others 0.075∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
Technical college or university degree 0.224∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
Months in Unemployment (div. by age-18) -.018∗∗∗ -.017∗∗∗ -.018∗∗∗ -.017∗∗∗
Months in Employment (div. by age-18) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) -.066∗∗∗ -.064∗∗∗ -.065∗∗∗ -.063∗∗∗
Level of UB (log(ben+1),mis=0) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
Seeking Self-Employment 0.048∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
Employment status before UE (Employed)
Subsidized Employment -.002 -.0008 -.001 -.00004
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. -.028∗∗ -.028∗∗ -.029∗∗ -.029∗∗
Maternity Leave 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
Other -.0009 0.0009 -.001 0.001
Months in regular employment in t-1 -.005∗∗∗ -.005∗∗∗ -.005∗∗∗ -.005∗∗∗
t-2 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
t-3 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
Ln(Wage) in Euro in t-1 0.011∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
t-2 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
t-3 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
Intergenerational: Father has A-level qualiﬁcations?
Not known
Yes 0.037∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.032∗∗
No 0.003 0.0007 0.003 0.0007
Intergenerational: Father in employment when interviewee was 15 years old?
Not known (or already dead)
Yes 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006
No 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.016
Living Situation
Own appartement/house
Rent -.007 -.009 -.007 -.009
Subletting -.036∗∗ -.038∗∗ -.035∗∗ -.036∗∗
Other -.008 -.003 -.005 -.001
Without 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.017
Available Means of Communication:
Landline Telephone -.028∗∗∗ -.025∗∗ -.028∗∗∗ -.025∗∗
Personal Mobile Phone 0.034∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗
Computer -.009 -.009 -.009 -.009
Printer 0.0004 -.0004 -.0005 -.0008
Internet 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.023
Email 0.033∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.028∗∗
Local UE Rate at Interview (below 5%)
5-10% -.030∗∗∗ -.031∗∗∗ -.030∗∗∗ -.031∗∗∗
10-15% -.036∗∗∗ -.038∗∗∗ -.035∗∗∗ -.037∗∗∗
15+% -.029∗ -.032∗ -.029∗ -.032∗
Obs. 7896 7896 7896 7896
Adjusted R-2 0.31 0.315 0.311 0.316
Note: Additional control variables used: Month of entry into unemployment (June 2007-May2008) and time between unemploy-
ment entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available on request by the authors.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
(a) Indices are standardized in the following way: Indexst
i = (Indexi − Mean(Index))/SD(Index).
29Table A.3: OLS Estimation Results: Search Intensity (Number of Own Applications)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Index (Standardized) 0.84∗∗∗ 0.304
Internal Index (Standardized) 1.482∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗






West Germany 2.047∗∗ 1.878∗ 2.259∗∗ 2.060∗∗
Female -.415 -.727 -.612 -.735
German citizenship -.891 -.704 -1.001 -.814
Married (or cohabiting) -.898 -.842 -.932 -.857
Children No Children (Reference cat.)
One Child -.901 -.935 -.890 -.922
Two (or more) Children -1.577∗ -1.576∗ -1.460 -1.502∗
Age (17-24 years)
Age (25-34 years) -3.011∗∗∗ -3.138∗∗∗ -3.068∗∗∗ -3.159∗∗∗
Age (35-44 years) -3.971∗∗∗ -4.143∗∗∗ -4.016∗∗∗ -4.180∗∗∗
Age (45-55 years) -4.162∗∗∗ -4.304∗∗∗ -4.286∗∗∗ -4.400∗∗∗
School Leaving Degree:
None, Special needs, other (ref.)
Lower Secondary School 0.029 -.009 0.144 0.101
Middle Secondary School -.397 -.563 -.009 -.242
Specialized upper Secondary School -1.202 -1.252 -.433 -.655
Vocational training
None (ref.)
Internal or external professional training, others -.030 -.037 0.074 0.067
Technical college or university degree 1.590 1.610 1.915 1.860
Months in Unemployment (div. by age-18) 0.29 0.328 0.277 0.316
Months in Employment (div. by age-18) 0.051 0.042 0.049 0.042
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) -1.491 -1.422 -1.531 -1.472
Level of UB (log(ben+1),mis=0) 0.258 0.249 0.265 0.258
Seeking Self-Employment 0.215 0.11 0.107 0.043
Employment status before UE (Employed)
Subsidized Employment 1.016 0.989 0.968 0.94
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. 0.387 0.506 0.454 0.551
Maternity Leave -3.568∗∗ -3.320∗∗ -3.494∗∗ -3.270∗∗
Other 0.697 0.86 0.706 0.851
Months in regular employment in years t − x before unemployment
t-1 -.282∗∗∗ -.276∗∗∗ -.284∗∗∗ -.277∗∗∗
t-2 -.014 -.013 -.016 -.013
t-3 -.046 -.043 -.046 -.044
Ln(Wage) in Euro in t-1 0.502∗ 0.461 0.504∗ 0.465
t-2 0.272 0.272 0.269 0.27
t-3 -.170 -.173 -.167 -.170
Intergenerational: Father has A-level qualiﬁcations?
Not known
Yes 1.169 1.200 1.256 1.252
No 0.307 0.298 0.314 0.296
Intergenerational: Father in employment when interviewee was 15 years old?
Not known (or already dead)
Yes 0.43 0.473 0.465 0.495
No 1.221 1.434 1.348 1.500
Living Situation
Own appartement/house
Rent 1.094∗ 1.021∗ 1.088∗ 1.020∗
Subletting 1.402 1.369 1.277 1.267
Other -4.152 -4.102 -4.379 -4.250
Without 1.457 1.526 1.413 1.542
Available Means of Communication:
Landline Telephone -1.481 -1.301 -1.482 -1.313
Personal Mobile Phone 2.650∗∗ 2.419∗∗ 2.572∗∗ 2.388∗∗
Computer -1.749 -1.801 -1.789 -1.831
Printer 2.381∗∗ 2.430∗∗ 2.460∗∗∗ 2.453∗∗∗
Internet 2.469∗ 2.491∗ 2.500∗ 2.553∗
Email -.052 -.188 0.051 -.126
Local UE Rate at Interview (below 5%)
5-10% 0.838 0.802 0.794 0.766
10-15% 1.766 1.628 1.660 1.566
15+% 1.752 1.652 1.748 1.662
Obs. 7896 7896 7896 7896
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.027 0.025 0.028
Note: Additional control variables used: Month of entry into unemployment (June 2007-May2008) and time between unemploy-
ment entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available on request by the authors.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
(a) Indices are standardized in the following way: Indexst
i = (Indexi − Mean(Index))/SD(Index).
30Table A.4: Propensity Score Estimation Results
Without Other Personality Traits With Other Personality Traits
Index: Full Internal External Full Internal External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Germany 0.053 -.325∗∗∗ -.216∗∗ -.010 -.378∗∗∗ -.180∗∗
Female -.206∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ -.160∗∗∗ -.109∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
German citizenship 0.118 0.033 -.024 0.206 0.13 -.059
Married (or cohabiting) 0.096∗ 0.118∗∗ -.046 0.131∗∗ 0.103∗ -.096
Children
No Children
One Child 0.007 -.015 0.01 -.0006 -.023 0.022
Two (or more) Children -.020 -.082 -.047 -.053 -.059 0.004
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) -.281∗∗∗ -.051 0.087 -.263∗∗ -.018 0.065
Level of UB (log(ben+1),mis=0) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.013 -.018 0.051∗∗∗ 0.01 -.016
Local UE Rate at Interview (below 5%)
5-10% 0.119∗ 0.093 -.089 0.11 0.085 -.078
10-15% 0.211∗∗ 0.151∗ -.130 0.174∗ 0.097 -.111
15+% 0.093 -.007 -.125 0.058 -.034 -.099
Personality Traits
Openness -.050∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
Conscientiousness 0.393∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ -.141∗∗∗
Extraversion 0.24∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ -.161∗∗∗
Neuroticism -.358∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
Intergenerational: Father worked at age 15
Not known (or already dead)
Yes 0.008 -.081 -.270∗∗ 0.006 -.036 -.273∗∗
No -.011 0.0004 -.193∗ -.020 0.026 -.196∗
Intergenerational: Father upper Schooling
Not known
Yes 0.015 -.068 0.07 0.023 -.069 0.069
No -.097 -.172 0.073 -.050 -.114 0.048
Living Situation
Own appartement/house
Rent -.036 -.009 0.004 -.064 -.035 0.019
Subletting -.129 0.046 0.272∗∗ -.135 0.032 0.283∗∗
Other -.524 0.078 0.628∗ -.469 0.028 0.556
Without 0.571 0.336 -.649 0.553 0.25 -.690
Available Means of Communication:
Landline Phone -.116 -.138∗ 0.051 -.068 -.103 0.012
Mobile 0.274∗∗∗ 0.132 -.119 0.19∗∗ 0.04 -.057
Computer 0.133 -.122 -.012 0.146 -.128 -.004
Printer -.057 -.034 0.019 -.123 0.004 0.111
Internet -.263∗∗ -.034 0.006 -.198∗ -.032 -.096
Email 0.459∗∗∗ 0.017 -.352∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ -.034 -.238∗∗
Age (17-24 years)
Age (25-34 years) -.092 0.036 0.146∗∗ -.101 -.005 0.133∗
Age (35-44 years) -.378∗∗∗ -.127∗ 0.366∗∗∗ -.433∗∗∗ -.154∗ 0.412∗∗∗
Age (45-55 years) -.666∗∗∗ -.142∗ 0.692∗∗∗ -.683∗∗∗ -.166∗ 0.705∗∗∗
School Leaving Degree
None, Special needs, other
Lower Secondary School 0.008 -.011 -.040 -.038 -.100 -.024
Middle Secondary School 0.201 -.296∗∗ -.329∗∗ 0.082 -.408∗∗∗ -.241
Specialized upper Secondary School 0.215 -.784∗∗∗ -.619∗∗∗ 0.099 -.849∗∗∗ -.521∗∗∗
Vocational training None
Internal or external professional training, others 0.191∗∗ -.164∗∗ -.208∗∗ 0.183∗∗ -.209∗∗ -.224∗∗∗
Technical college or university degree 0.358∗∗∗ -.469∗∗∗ -.536∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ -.488∗∗∗ -.503∗∗∗
Months in Unemployment (div. by age-18) -.073∗∗∗ 0.013 0.08∗∗∗ -.054∗∗∗ 0.02 0.065∗∗∗
Months in Employment (div. by age-18) 0.009∗∗ 0.008∗ -.007 0.005 0.004 -.004
Employment status before Unemployment
Employed
Subsidized Employment 0.017 0.013 0.141 -.005 0.015 0.185∗
School, Apprentice, Military, etc. 0.123 -.086 -.153∗ 0.147∗ -.058 -.165∗
Maternity Leave 0.016 -.029 -.137 0.084 0.02 -.202
Other -.252∗∗∗ -.123 0.192∗∗ -.220∗∗ -.079 0.18∗
Months in regular employment in
t-1 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.017∗ 0.004 0.0009
t-2 0.01 0.013 -.014 0.014 0.011 -.019∗∗
t-3 -.002 0.007 0.009 -.002 0.008 0.01
Ln(Wage) in Euro in
t-1 -.060∗∗ -.025 0.037 -.083∗∗∗ -.034 0.055∗∗
t-2 0.021 0.004 -.009 0.021 0.004 -.008
t-3 0.012 -.020 -.024 0.008 -.020 -.022
Obs. 8910 8910 8910 8910 8910 8910
Rˆ 2 0.036 0.039 0.055 0.106 0.096 0.129
log-Likelihood -5956.52 -5930.809 -5837.284 -5523.382 -5582.509 -5381.61
e(hitrate) 59.012 59.495 61.268 66.049 65.432 67.486
Note: The propensity score is estimated using a logit model. The groups are deﬁned according to having a high (treated) or
low (control) index value. See Figure 2 for the relevant thresholds. Columns 4-6 include other personality traits as explanatory
variables; columns 1-3 do not.
Additional control variables used in the estimation: Months of entry into unemployment (June 2007 - April 2008) and time
between entry and interview (in weeks). Full estimation results are available on request by the authors.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
31B Notes on Theoretical Framework
Proposition 1. Individuals with a more internal locus of control have higher reservation
wages and search more intensively than those with a more external locus of control, i.e.,
∂s∗
∂loc > 0 and
∂φ
∂loc > 0.
Proof. Equation (5) gives the relationship between the reservation wage φ and the optimal






















∂loc − λ(s∗)λ00(s) ∂s∗
∂loc














The job arrival rate depends positively on an individual’s search eﬀort, but at a decreasing
rate, i.e., λ0 > 0 and λ00 < 0, while search costs are increasing in search eﬀort, i.e., c0 > 0
and c00 > 0. Thus, the expression in square brackets is positive which implies that ∂φ/∂loc
and ∂s∗/∂loc have the same sign.
Equation (4) shows that individuals choose their optimal search eﬀort by equating the
marginal cost of job search with the marginal beneﬁts of additional search. Diﬀerentiating



































































(w − φ)dF(w) (12)
The right-hand-side term in square brackets is positive. This implies that in order for
equation (12) to hold ∂s∗
∂loc and
∂φ
∂loc must both be positive. If they were both negative,
the left-hand side of equation (12) would be negative while the right-hand side would be
positive.
32B.1 Alternative Model
We now consider an alternative model, in which a function of the locus of control con-
tributes to the job arrival rate additively: λa(s,loc) = λ(s)+f(loc). As before, we continue
to assume that f0(loc) > 0,c0 > 0,c00 > 0,λ0 > 0 and λ00 < 0.
In this case, the utilities of accepting a job oﬀer at wage w, Ve(w) and of continuing















+(1 − (λ(s) + f(loc))dt)Vu] (14)
The reservation wage is given by:
















(w − φ)dF(w) (15)
Unemployed individuals choose their search eﬀort and reservation wage so as to max-
imize Vu over an inﬁnite horizon. The reservation wage deﬁnes the search stopping rule
and thus satisﬁes the condition that Vu = Ve(w). Substituting this constraint into the
optimization problem, we can show that the optimal search behavior is determined by the
maximization of Vu = φ/r with resoect to s. This implies that we can solve for the optimal
search eﬀort s∗ by diﬀerentiating the previous equation with respect to (s) and solving for






(w − φ)dF(w) (16)
Substituting this expression into equation 15 we get:








(w − φ)dF(w) (17)
Proposition 2. In this alternative model, individuals with a more internal locus of
control have higher reservation wages, but search less intensively than those with a more
external locus of control, i.e., ∂s∗
∂loc < 0 and
∂φ
∂loc > 0.



















































Given that c00 > 0, λ0 > 0 and λ00 < 0, the expression in square brackets on the right-
hand side is positive, while the expression in square brackets on the left-hand side is
negative. Thus, equation (19) shows that ∂s
∂loc and
∂φ
∂loc must have opposite signs. Moreover,




































∂loc − λ(s)λ00(s) ∂s
∂loc































































In equation (21) the terms in square brackets are both positive. Thus, equation (21) only
holds if ∂s
∂loc < 0 and
∂φ
∂loc > 0.
34